As the U.S. Supreme Court imposes federalism-based limits on congressional power under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may be tempted to turn to the conditional spending power in order to achieve goals that it cannot realize directly. In this article I address whether a danger exists, as some suggest, that such use of the Spending Clause would render the Court more likely to cut back on its scope, narrowing or overruling South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Using doctrinal analysis and game theory, I conclude that Congress should proceed with some but not great caution. It may sensibly operate within the large universe of interventions that do not implicate the subject matter of previous decisions. Moreover, Congress may sensibly operate within the small universe of interventions that do implicate the subject matter of past rulings if the Court in these decisions indicated the permissibility of a Spending Clause substitute or if Congress deems its interest sufficiently important that it is worth taking the modest risk of causing the Court to revisit Dole.
whatever drinking age it wanted, and yet we upheld the Spending Clause condition that if they accepted Federal funds, they had to set their drinking age at 21." 2 And when counsel tried to make the compelled-speech argument that students did not believe the schools' message of nondiscrimination because the recruiters were present, the Chief Justice interrupted: "The reason they don't believe you is because you're willing to take the money. What you're saying is, 'This is a message -[Laughter] -we believe in strongly, but we don't believe in it, to the tune of $100 million." 3 Later in the argument, he reiterated that "you're perfectly free to do [what you want] if you don't take the money." 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist could not have advanced the view that the greater power includes the lesser any more forcefully.
In Dole, the Court held that Congress may condition five percent of federal highway funds on the adoption by recipient states of a 21-year-old drinking age, even assuming (but not deciding) that the Twenty-First Amendment would prohibit Congress from imposing a national minimum drinking age directly. 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist stressed for the majority that the condition imposed by Congress was "clearly stated," was "directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds are expended-safe interstate travel," and was not "so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion." For example, the Court has held that Congress did not lawfully employ its commerce power to prohibit gun possession in a school zone or to provide a private civil remedy for victims of 16 But Dole allows Congress to condition grants of related federal funds on the agreement of states to perform any of these roles. 17 As a doctrinal matter, all of this federal action appears permissible under Dole. 15 See, e.g., infra note 146 (citing a relevant D.C. Circuit opinion by then-Judge Roberts). 16 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the "take title" provision of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which required states either to regulate radioactive waste in accordance with Congress' requirements or to take title to the waste, constitutes unconstitutional compulsion and commandeering of state governments); Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997) (holding unconstitutional interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers). 17 See infra note 57 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166-67).
What is less clear among commentators is what
provided by federal dollars as a potent tool left undisturbed by current law, one that Congress should employ extensively to pursue national objectives. 18 "Not so fast," assert defenders of state authority. Professors Lynn Baker and Mitchell
Berman of the University of Texas at Austin, for example, caution critics of the Court who argue that Congress should respond aggressively to the Court's federalism decisions by using the Spending Clause to "circumvent" them. 19 Professors Baker and Berman submit "that the strategy urged by these commentators is a risky one that might provoke the Court to abandon Dole in favor of something much less hospitable to congressional power." 20 They predict:
[N]ot even [Chief Justice] Rehnquist's pride of authorship would commit him to Dole if that test permits-as it very probably would-an unvarnished circumvention of one of the majority's decisions limiting congressional power. And if Dole goes, it is anybody's guess what may replace it. The replacement, however, might prove fatal to spending legislation that would have survived Dole, and might even prove fatal to legislation that already has survived Dole. In short, we believe that those who would urge Congress to exploit Dole to check the Rehnquist Court's states' rights revival might benefit from being more sensitive to the context-dependence of the creation of judicial doctrine. Put another way, we are urging a greater sensitivity to the need for strategic thinking.
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Professors Baker and Berman "rais[e] the specter . . . of perverse consequences," insisting that "a too-clever Congress could push a partially reluctant Supreme Court to curb the most important congressional power that the Court's states' rights revival has thus far left untouched." , many of the goals Congress seeks to achieve may still be pursued through the federal spending power."). 19 Baker & Berman, supra note 7. 20 Id. at 460. 21 Id. at 461. 22 Id.
Professors Baker and Berman anticipate the objection that a Court inclined to overrule
Dole will do so regardless of what Congress does and thus that Congress should enact laws that it deems desirable without fear of an adverse judicial response. "The risk that ought to give Congress pause," they write, "is that in striking down the circumventionist legislation, the Court could reinvigorate Dole, or replace it, in ways that would prove fatal to noncircumventionist uses of the spending power that would have sailed through in the absence of any such change in judicial doctrine." 23 I use doctrinal analysis and game theory to mediate this dispute among would-be congressional counselors. Employing readily comprehensible models, I scrutinize both theses by identifying their underlying assumptions, examining whether their conclusions follow from their assumptions, and evaluating the legal validity of these assumptions in light of the case law.
Because the arguments on each side of this debate can be modeled as a strategic game, the proper resolution of the debate turns not on whether one displays "sensitivity to the need for strategic thinking," 24 but rather on one's view of the content of the Court's preference orderings over the various possible outcomes in the strategic interaction. 23 Id. at 541. Because Professors Baker and Berman devote much of their article to explaining "why Dole should be abandoned," id. at 469-85, the question arises whether they are engaging in strategic behavior. They argue that Congress should not use the spending power aggressively because doing so might cause the Court to cut back on its scope. But this outcome is exactly the result that they seek. So why do they urge congressional caution? They explain their "cautionary note," which "may seem to be against interest," as animated by the concern that "all depends upon what replaces Dole"; an "ill-conceived congressional provocation is apt to engender just the sort of illconceived judicial reaction from which sound constitutional doctrine is particularly unlikely to issue." Id. at 541. They make a sensible point. But in evaluating their thesis, one should bear in mind that they would want Congress to take their advice even if the advice were decisively determined to be unsound. Professor Baker in particular is one of the leading proponents, if not the leading proponent, of strict judicial limits on the scope of the spending power. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195 (2001) ; Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 REV. (1995 . Thus, her urging Congress to restrain itself in order to avoid an adverse judicial response must be understood in the context of her overall advocacy. Obviously, another way to achieve her goal would be for Congress to self-regulate by limiting its use of the spending power. intellectual reciprocity. Constitutional scholars are well positioned not only to use analytic tools developed by others, but also to sharpen these tools by discerning the meaning derived from close reading of constitutional texts. The solution to a model of the congressional-Court dynamic is compelled by the payoffs in the game. And these payoffs, if they are to be meaningful and not arbitrary or results-oriented, must be grounded in independent legal judgments about the views of the Justices on the subject matter at issue. Constitutional lawyers, not social scientists, are best situated to render such judgments.
Part I formalizes the argument that congressional use of the spending power in response to judicially imposed limits on other powers would cause the Court to narrow or overrule Dole. 29 See infra Part III for discussion of the possible meaning(s) of "circumvention." In assessing Professors Baker and Berman's argument, I assume that a "circumvention" phenomenon exists. I note, however, that the term is definitionally ambiguous and conceptually problematic insofar as given government conduct either violates Supreme Court precedent or does not. If the former, it may not be circumvention; rather, it may just be a repetition of unlawful conduct. If the latter, it also may not be circumvention; it may just be lawful conduct. If the state of constitutional law is uncertain or indeterminate, as it often is, then it may be just as unclear or indeterminate whether a given government action is lawful or unlawful, but the action still may not constitute circumvention. In short, the term "circumvention" may be of limited usefulness, and it may tend to disappear when one is more precise about the rationale of the decision that allegedly has been "circumvented." 30 Chief Justice Rehnquist was Dole's author and a member of the conservative majority who likely continued to view Dole as correctly decided. The possibility that Chief Justice Roberts may be a different type of conservative on federalism issues renders the future constitutionality of many instances of conditional federal spending uncertain. But see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (offering evidence that the views of the current Chief Justice are similar to those of his predecessor . 49 The argument would be that the Court has had opportunities to overrule Dole but has declined to do so. 50 At the same time, members of the conservative majority have stated that they do not want Congress to try to use Dole to undermine the 46 The symbol ">" means "is preferred to." The preference orderings of Congress and the Court can be combined in a game tree.
The Court moves first, Congress moves second by using the Spending Clause (SC) or declining to act, and the game ends when the Court responds.
51 See supra note 7. This reasoning reflects but also transcends the revealed-preference foundations of game theory. The argument embodies the assumption that a rational actor's choice behavior (here, judicial voting) reveals her preferences. But the argument also transcends behaviorism by parsing the communications of the Justices in their opinions. 
[D] Because this is an extensive game, it can be solved using backwards induction. 53 Starting at the end, the best replies of the Court and Congress are underlined. 54 It is apparent from Figure   One that if Congress responds to a regulatory invalidation by using its conditional spending power under Dole, the Court will respond by striking down the law and cutting Dole back.
Congress is thus better off not attempting a spending-power substitute. Congress would prefer to "exploit" apparent "loopholes" in existing federalism doctrine (as Professors Baker and Berman would put it) in a non-strategic world -that is, a world in which the Court's behavior was not in 53 Backwards induction counsels looking first at what the last-mover will do in the final round of a finitely repeated game. In the Baker-Berman Dole game, the last-mover is the Court. Backwards induction then advises turning to the next-to-last round, which is now effectively the last round. For a discussion of backwards induction, see OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 99-100; Siegel, supra note 41, at 1178-1179. 54 An actor's best reply to a choice of strategy by the other player(s) maximizes the actor's payoff. For a formal definition and discussion of best-reply or best-response functions, see OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 15. part responsive to the conduct of Congress. But this is not the world modeled by the BakerBerman Dole game. In this setting, one whose connection to the real legal world is explored in Parts II and III, "context dependence" exists in "the creation of judicial doctrine."
55 Thus,
Congress is best off not trying to "circumvent" the Court's decisions by using its conditional spending authority.
56
By not enacting a spending-power substitute, Congress cannot achieve its second mostpreferred outcome and the corresponding payoff of 3. Instead, it is left with its third-best result and an associated payoff of 2. But at the same time, Congress avoids the worst possible outcome and a payoff of only 1. The game tracks Professors Baker and Berman's advice to advocates of congressional power: "If you think things are bad now, understand that they are not nearly as bad as they could be -and might become if you press the issue."
II. GOING BANANAS OVER DOLE
Critical to the Baker-Berman analysis in Part I is the suggestion that the Supreme Court would not want Congress to act through the Spending Clause to achieve results that the Court has not allowed Congress to pursue by using other constitutional grants of legislative power. But this assumption may not accurately reflect the preferences over outcomes of five current Justices. 55 Baker & Berman, supra note 7, at 461. 56 The profile of strategies generating the (4,2) outcome -that is, the Court invalidates the regulation and trims Dole in response to a spending-power substitute, while Congress declines to enact such a substitute -is not only a Nash equilibrium; it is also the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium is the most basic solution concept in game theory. It is a profile of strategies in which no player has an incentive to change her strategy, given the strategies of the other players. Nash equilibria are thus stable in the sense that once achieved, no one has reason to deviate. OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 14-15. In an extensive game, however, Nash equilibria are unsatisfactory because they ignore the sequential structure of the decision problems in the game, thus not distinguishing between equilibria that do and do not depend on noncredible threats. Because Nash equilibria do not account for the credibility of threats supporting equilibria, it is necessary to define a notion of equilibrium that captures this consideration. This solution concept, subgame perfection, eliminates Nash equilibria in which player threats are not credible by requiring that the actions prescribed by each player's equilibrium strategy be optimal, given the strategies of the other players, within each subgame. See id. at 97. Judging from this textual evidence, the Court might not perceive a conditional federal grant after New York as congressional "circumvention"; on the contrary, the Court might view the grant as an instance in which Congress was exercising its constitutional authority appropriately. Indeed, it is somewhat perverse to view congressional action as "circumvention" -as attempting to "exploit" a "loophole" -when Congress follows to the letter the Court's instructions to legislate in one way and not another. A "permissible substitution" seems a more apt description.
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Other evidence from the U.S. Reports supports this position and cannot be dismissed. In The Court could have sustained the statute on several relatively narrow grounds. Because
Congress arguably could use the spending power to exceed the federalism-based limits imposed by the Court on the commerce power, one option was to hold only that §666(a)(2) falls within congressional authority under the Spending and Necessary and Proper Clauses because bribery inherently implicates commercial activity. 70 Another possibility was to limit the holding to 66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Baker & Berman, supra note 7, at 488 ("[T]he Court's unanimous willingness to resolve the case on dubious -and substantially underdeveloped -Commerce Clause grounds may indicate that the justices are ill-disposed to tinker with existing Spending Clause jurisprudence."); Amar, supra note 34, at 355 ("This Commerce Clause focus was itself a somewhat surprising aspect of Guillen. As the case came up the appellate ladder, it seemed to center more on Congress' power to attach conditions to federal funding -the so-called 'spending clause' power. Indeed, many scholars thought that Guillen might be the first in a series of spending clause cases to come -a fifth line of cases, if you will -to round out the new federalism. Instead, the Court dodged the spending clause question, and upheld Congressional power under the Commerce Clause." (footnote omitted)). 68 74 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (stressing that the criminal law at issue "by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms"). 75 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (emphasizing "the role that the economic nature of the regulated activity plays in our Commerce Clause analysis"). 76 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605-608. 77 Id. at 606. 78 Id. at 605. 91 See, e.g., Baker & Berman, supra note 7, at 506-07 ("The States' Rights Five have made clear in a variety of contexts that they will not allow their substantive doctrines to be evaded by niceties of pleading. Surely they will be just as committed to ensuring that federalism does not become an ingenious exercise in legislative drafting." (footnote omitted)). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that if the six-Justice majority "is right, then Lopez stands for nothing more than a drafting guide"). Justice O'Connor's point concerns a different kind of drafting: she is worried about permitting Congress to draft its way out of commerce-related limits while still legislating under the Commerce Clause, not about letting Congress do the same thing under a different power. But both situations implicate an alleged tension between federalism values and drafting form. 92 See supra notes 11, 74 and accompanying text. 93 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the commerce power extends to purely intrastate activity that does not produce goods for sale if Congress rationally concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut regulation of the interstate market in the commodity produced by the activity). 94 114 See, e.g., supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing this claim). 115 The Court's views of state sovereign dignity and potential federal coercion may be related. Just as dignitary concerns require treating states as "grown ups," so part of being a grown up entails taking personal responsibility and saying "no" even in the face of great temptation. If it makes scant sense to personify states in one of these ways, then it probably makes little sense to personify states in the other as well. 116 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. its meaning needs to be specified precisely. 121 The Court may have one of several views when it strikes down a law as exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause or Section Five. One possibility, whose validity might justify the "circumvention" label, 122 is that the Court thinks 119 Baker & Berman, supra note 7, at 461. 120 The models in Parts I and II oversimplify a nuanced interaction within and among the branches. One complication is that the "game" between Congress and the Court is always being played on multiple subject-matter fronts. Thus, the interaction in one area may be partly a function of the dynamic in others. In this situation, the predictive power of any one subject-matter model is reduced. To avoid this problem, the modeler would have to show an absence of significant spillover effects from the other games being played by Congress and the Court.
One could complicate the foregoing models by including more possible moves (e.g., different degrees of judicial responses) or additional players -e.g., different groups within Congress, see supra note 43, or the public. The Justices are not indifferent to public acceptance of their decisions, at least over the long run. See, e.g. Neil S. Siegel, Umpires At Bat: On Integration and Legitimation (unpublished manuscript on file with author). And of course members of Congress worry about reelection. Because the public makes no moves in the previous games, the models obviously simplify reality. This simplification, however, makes sense in light of the context. While it is always difficult to predict how possible public reaction affects the Court, such predictions are particularly perilous in the area of federalism, where the public has little understanding and interest. If the Court were to revisit a popular spending program, such as provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, public reaction might play a role.
In light of my omission of the public as a player, the analysis is best viewed as addressing the many situations in which the choices of Congress and the Court are unlikely to cause a strong public reaction. Assuming that the federalism cases decided by the Roberts Court result in public reactions similar to those generated by the Rehnquist Court, possible public reaction is unlikely to matter much. . While claims about substance federalism and form federalism are empirically falsifiable based on how the Court decides cases, form plus pique is different because there is no sure way to know if the Court is expressing a commitment to federalism, pique, or both. If pique exists, it would manifest itself in the Court's choosing the substance federalist option rather than the form federalist alternative. When the Court decides that a matter exceeds the scope of a particular power, it is likely not focusing on which of these two models it has in mind. This issue arises when Congress tries to accomplish the same regulatory objective through another power. Then the Court must decide if it is substance federalist or form federalist. If pique exists, it may cause the Court to render the substance federalist decision. I therefore conceive pique as a reason that the Court would choose the substance federalist outcome.
Court does not care about the substance of federalism per se in spending-power cases so much as it does not want to be "shown up" by a Congress that questions its authority. [T]he Spending Clause, if wielded without concern for the federal balance, has the potential to obliterate distinctions between national and local spheres of interest and power by permitting the Federal Government to set policy in the most sensitive areas of traditional state concern, areas which otherwise would lie outside its reach. funds is unrelated to the purpose of the funds or unconstitutionally coercive when the subject matter is a sensitive subject of state concern (however defined), but not when some other subject matter is at issue. 134 The doctrinal requirement of relatedness seems to concern the connection between means and ends -between the condition on federal funds and the purpose of the 131 
Id.
132 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). The Garcia Court "reject[ed], as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular government function is 'traditional' or 'integral.'" 469 U.S. at 546-47. 133 
134 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the relatedness and coercion requirements). federal spending program. It does not implicate an independent evaluation of the importance of congressional ends from the standpoint of federalism values. Moreover, it is not clear why the same condition on a given number of federal dollars is more coercive when the context is a traditional subject of state concern than when the setting is otherwise. Pre-empirically, it seems reasonable to presume a relatively equal degree of coerciveness across subject-matter categories.
A more likely possibility is that the Court will strengthen across the board (that is, regardless of whether a traditional subject of state concern is implicated) the existing requirement that conditions be clearly stated. 135 This may happen regardless of whether 143 139 Id. at 2465 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 140 Id. at 2459. There is also no indication that the Court is likely to adopt Professor Baker's distinction between "regulatory spending" and "reimbursement spending." See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 REV. , 1962 REV. -63 (1995 . 141 Of course, any given Justice may care about more than one of these considerations, so that the differences in particular cases may be more a matter of degree than kind. For example, a basically form federalist Justice may react with pique if Congress goes out of its way to antagonize the Court. Alternatively, a basically substance federalist Justice may still think that the form of congressional action makes some difference to the constitutional inquiry. 142 The situation could be modeled as a signaling game, which requires analysis of player moves and player beliefs about the signaling player's "type." See OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 237-38. First the Court hands down a decision, then Congress draws an inference about the Court's type based on the language in the opinion and acts accordingly, and finally the Court responds by sustaining or trimming Dole. Conceiving the interaction as a signaling game may suggest that judicial language matters, but not just because it explains the Court's rationale. The language, as opposed to the holding or judgment, may also signal certain deeply held concerns of the Court. This possibility informs my conjecture that the constitutional scope of the spending power was on the minds of at least some of the Justices in Cutter. See Perhaps the Court does not want to trigger a congressional response that would require it to revisit Dole because of the legitimacy costs that can accompany disrespect for precedent and the doctrinal complications that would have to be negotiated. The Justices may also worry that a Court that disrespects precedent may encourage others, including future Courts, to do the same. Accordingly, Justices committed to federalism in a real but limited way may use aggressive language to signal a robust commitment to federalism. Whether this degree of stated commitment is credible depends upon the Court's or the signaling Justice's type. Thus, ambiguous language in some opinions may reflect not just an attempt to secure a majority, but also an effort to deter a congressional "override." Through careful drafting, the Court can seek to vindicate the degree of its commitment to federalism without having to revisit Dole or to reveal its disinclination to do so. It may write that federalism means X and Congress is constrained when it is not prepared to vindicate federalism values to such a robust extent. Congress must then decide whether to call the Court's bluff.
As discussed in the text, what is presently unclear is both the identity of the median Justice and whether he is a form federalist or something further to the right.
revealed some desire to restrict congressional authority under the Commerce Clause while endorsing broad use of the conditional spending power. It is also possible that there is path dependence to pique. Perhaps certain Justices would vote or write differently in City of Boerne if they had to do it over again, and they do not want to make the same mistake going forward. 169 We know now that Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer object strenuously to the Court's subsequent reliance on the separation-of-powers 166 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006) (holding that lower courts did not err in determining that the federal government had failed to demonstrate, as it must under RFRA, a compelling interest in enforcing a federal statutory ban on sacramental use of hoasca, a hallucinogenic tea). 167 Id. at 1216-17 & n.1. 168 See, e.g., Post, supra note 31, at 47 n. 217 (" [T] he Court perceives the exercise of Section 5 power as a threat to its interpretive monopoly, whereas it does not perceive the exercise of Article I powers as threatening in the same way. This is not because Congress interprets the Constitution any less in exercising its Article I powers, but because the Court believes that congressional interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment rights is closer to the kind of constitutional interpretation routinely practiced by courts." (internal citation omitted) 171 Because only the most brazen, "in-your-face" action by Congress would prompt the Court to revisit an issue that it would rather avoid, and because the present indications are that the Court would prefer not to revisit Dole, the range over which the game-theoretic "provocation" principle might operate is very narrow, and no action is likely to materialize in this range in any event. If the Court revisits Dole, it most likely will use as a vehicle not a substitution statute, but one in which Congress put a Dole criterion to the test without having reacted to a decision by the Court. Congress would therefore be well advised to assess the expected costs and benefits before enacting laws that put pressure on the Dole requirements to an unprecedented extent. 172 One potentially non-obvious implication of the pique phenomenon is that Congress should employ the Spending Clause as a weapon of first resort when the alternative is a constitutionally suspect use of the Commerce Clause or Section Five. This strategic interaction could be modeled by adding a stage before the first round of the games in Parts I and II. In the initial round of this four-stage game, Congress would choose between regulating (i.e., relying on the Commerce Clause or Section Five) and using the conditional spending power. If Congress elected to regulate, then the game in Parts I and II would unfold. If Congress chose instead to use the conditional spending power, then the game would end.
The last part of the above formulation is critical. One must accord appropriate weight to the significance of the congressional interests in particular cases. A modest degree of legislative caution is warranted in light of the possibility that aggressive use of the spending power could trigger a reaction by the Court to limit the spending power. But to the extent that its members are able to come together and function as a rational actor, Congress still should consider the importance of the goal that it wants to achieve by enacting a particular spending power statute.
The expected benefits of a particular spending law must be considered alongside the expected costs; strategic behavior by Congress must follow from a balancing of the expected gains (the importance of the bill under consideration) against the risks (the possibility of provoking the Court to cut Dole back). Such a cost-benefit tradeoff will exist as long as the probability of provocation is less than 1. And such provocation is far from certain if Congress legislates aggressively pursuant to the Spending Clause in a given instance.
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CONCLUSION
When one accounts for the breadth of the universe of potential spending-power interventions that do not implicate the subject matter of previous Court decisions, the narrowness 173 I have assumed throughout that members of Congress care about the extent to which the Court constrains use of the conditional spending power. To the extent that this assumption is inaccurate -perhaps, as has been suggested to me, because Congress can impose implicit conditions that cannot be policed judicially by choosing to fund or not to fund certain activities based simply upon what it sees states doing or not doing in the world -the strategic situation changes profoundly. Indeed, if Congress is indifferent to the Court's decisions, no strategic interaction exists. Most commentators, however, believe otherwise regardless of their ideological commitments. And the recent Senate confirmation hearings for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito suggest that members of Congress care intensely about the Court's federalism decisions as a general matter. When the Court invalidates a federal law in the name of federalism, the people in Congress who supported the law tend to react strongly to the bad news from across the street. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on "circumvention" and permissible substitutions, nor can strategic arguments identify the various ways in which the Court might tighten Dole's generous requirements. 174 The claim in the text about the relative breadth of the two categories follows from the reality that the Rehnquist Court invalidated only a handful of federal laws on federalism grounds. Naturally, difficult questions of categorization will arise at the margins. Whether a particular use of the conditional spending power falls into one category or the other may depend on how broadly one reads the Court's holdings in, for example, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich. 175 See supra note 23. 176 See, e.g., Choper, supra note 7.
In strategic settings, however, static doctrinal analysis may not be enough. Detailing all of the ways that Congress can get out from under one set of decisions by relying on another is insufficient. One must also examine the likelihood that the Court would revisit the latter series of holdings if a majority of Justices concluded that Congress was playing this very game. In other words, one must assess the content of the Court's preference orderings over the various possible outcomes in the strategic interaction at issue.
Beyond the question of Dole's future, therefore, a place exists for strategic analysis of constitutional law. 177 Constitutional inquiry should not assume that the Court never behaves strategically. It is constituted by nine highly opinionated lawyers whose ideological and methodological commitments cause them to care greatly (though not exclusively) about outcomes, as well as their continuing authority to determine these outcomes. It is therefore important to think about constitutional doctrine as partly a consequence of strategic interactions between Congress and the Court. This point may seem more evident regarding questions of statutory interpretation, where a Court that does not have the last word may seek to avoid a congressional override. But a similar dynamic is at work in more subtle ways in constitutional cases. The Court has the last word absent an amendment, but reality is more complicated.
Congress can sometimes react to adverse decisions by using a distinct source of power. And though the Court can take away the various options, such judicial behavior is hardly costless.
Congress retains leverage because the Court may not want to bear the legitimacy and rule-of-law costs of overruling precedent, nor may it want to deal with the potentially treacherous doctrinal 177 I have not defended the proposition that Congress or the Court ought to behave strategically. Rather, I have argued that both institutions do behave strategically, at least some of the time, and I have advocated certain instrumental behavior on the part of Congress in order to achieve certain substantive ends. This analysis, therefore, will be a non-starter for those who believe that Congress and the Court should behave in certain ways as a matter of principle regardless of how the other can be expected to react.
